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and Jord an  in  Jordan.  In rural  Egypt  the anc  L  j orc  an  poor receive  almost  60
percent of their income from
Richard  H. Adams, Jr.  nonfarm sources,  while in
rural Jordan they receive  less
than 20 percent. The reason
for this difference is land: in
rural Egypt, agricultural land
is  very productive, but access
is  quite limited, and so the
poor are "pushed" into
nonfarm work; while in rural
Jordan, land is not very
productive, and access  is  not
highly prized. In both
countries the best  way to
reduce poverty and inequality
might be to focus on nonfarm
unskilled labor.
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Summary findings
The rural economy of developing countries has long  rural population  does not press for access  to land because
been regarded as synonymous with agriculture but in  the attractive economic rates of return are found in the
recent years this view has begun to change. Such diverse  nonfarm sector. Unlike Egypt's rich, rural Jordan's  rich
activities as government, commerce, and services are now  earn less than  10 perceht of their total per capita income
seen as providing most income in rural households.  from agriculture and more than 55 percent of it from
Applying decomposition analysis to two new nationally  nonfarm sources.
representative sets of household data from Egypt and  *  The poor in both countries depend heavily on
Jordan, Adams examines how different sources of  government employment to decrease inequality.
income-including  nonfarm income-affect  inequality in  Government wages provide 43 percent of nonfarm
rural income. He concludes:  income for Egypt's rural poor and 60 percent of
- Nonfarm income has different impacts on poverty  Jordan's.  But since both governments already employ far
and inequality in the two countries. In Egypt the poor  more workers than they can possibly use, advocating
(those in the lowest quintile) receive almost 60 percent  increased government employment to reduce inequality
of their per capita income from nonfarm income. In  would not be wise policy advice. From a policy
Jordan the poor receive less than 20 percent of their  standpoint,  it would be better to reduce income
income from nonfarm income. So nonfarm income  inequality by focusing on nonfarm unskilled labor (for
decreases inequality in Egypt and increases it in Jordan.  example, in construction, brick-making, and ditch-
* Access to land accounts for this difference between  digging), an important income source.
the two countries. In Egypt the cultivated land base is  *  In Egypt nonfarm income decreases inequality
totally irrigated and very highly productive.  Egypt's large  because inadequate access  to land "pushes" poorer
rural population  seeks access to land but because the  households out of agriculture and into the nonfarm
land-to-people ratio is so unfavorable, only a minority of  sector. Although agricultural income is positively
rural inhabitants actually own land. The rest-especially  associated with land ownership in rural Egypt, that
the poor-are  forced to seek work in the nonfarm sector.  ownership is unevenly distributed in favor of the rich, so
By contrast, only 30 percent of Jordan's  cultivated land  nonfarm income is not linked to land ownership and is
base is irrigated and crop yields are low.  So Jordan's  thus more important  to the rural poor.
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In the past many researchers and policymakers  have viewed the rural economy of
developing countries as being synonymous with agriculture. According to this view,
rural households receive most of their income from the production of food and export
crops.
In more recent years, this view has begun to change. There is now a growing
recognition  that rural households receive their income from a diverse portfolio of
activities,' and that one of the most important of these activities is that connected with the
rural nonfarm sector. In some cases the rural nonfarm sector - which includes such
diverse activities as government, commerce and services - is now seen as providing the
bulk of income to rural households.
This changed view is partly due to the evolving concept of the broader
relationship  between agriculture, the rural nonfarm sector and the poor.  During the 1970s
and early 1980s,  Mellor and Lele, Mellor, and Johnston and Kilby emphasized the growth
linkages effects of agricultural growth. 2 According to this literature, technological  4
change in agriculture boosts production, thereby increasing the incomes of landowning
households. In turn, these landowning households use their new income to buy more
labor-intensive  goods and services, which are produced by the poor working in small-
scale firms in the rural nonfarm sector. Thus, accelerated growth in agriculture has both
production linkages that provide the poor with more food, and consumption linkages that
provide the poor with more employment opportunities in the rural nonfarm sector.
While the dissemination of high-yielding  varieties of rice and wheat may have
had large multiplier effects on the rural nonfarm sector in certain Asian countries, in
many developing countries these multiplier effects have been quite small. For example,2
de Janvry and Sadoulet argue that the unequal distribution of land and income in Latin
America (and other developing countries) mean that only a handful of landowners benefit
from the income effects of agricultural growth. 3 Since these large landowners prefer to
buy luxury items produced by imports, they do not demand the type of labor-intensive
goods and services which are produced by the poor in the rural nonfarm sector. For this
reason, de Janvry and Sadoulet argue that in land-constrained areas of the developing
world - like Latin America and certain parts of the Middle East and Asia - focusing
directly on the rural nonfarm sector might provide a better way of increasing the income
and employment opportunities of the poor. In this view, income earned in the rural
nonfarm sector represents the agent of positive change for the poor in the rural economy,
rather than income earned from the traditional agricultural sector.
Despite this cnanged view, there is still no agreement in the empirical literature on
two key issues, namely: (a) what is the impact of rural nonfarm income on income
inequality?; and (b) vhat is the link between land, nonfarm income and overall rural
inequality? On the one hand, studies by Lanjouw in Ecuador, Adams in Pakistan and
Chinn in Taiwan indicate that nonfarm income reduces rural income inequality. 4
According  to Adams, 5 nonfarm income benefits the poor because the share of nonfarm
income varies inversely with both size of land owned and total rural income. On the
other hand, studies in Africa have generally produced very different results.  For instance,
Reardon and Taylor in Burkina Faso, Collier, Radwan and Wangwe in Tanzania and
Matlon in Nigeria find that nonfarm income has a negative impact on rural income
distribution because it is mainly large landowners who receive nonfarm income. 6
Part of this inconsistency may be explained by differences in the key factor noted
above, namely, the distribution of land. While many factors affect land distribution,' on3
the whole, in land-scarce, labor rich countries - like Pakistan and much of Latin America
- inadequate access to land may tend to "push" poorer rural households out of agriculture
and into the nonfarm sector. Thus, in these countries, nonfarm income may have a
positive impact on inequality and poverty. The obverse, then, could hold in land-rich,
labor-scarce  countries - such as Africa - where ample land access may tend to keep most
people in agriculture and  to "pull" only richer households into the nonfarm sector.
This paper proposes to clarify the impact of nonfarm income and unequal land
distribution on rural income inequality by analyzing the results of two new, nationally-
representative household surveys in Egypt and Jordan. The choice of these two countries
for analysis is conscious: both countries lie in the MENA (Middle East and North
African) region and thus share many economic and social similarities. However, for the
purposes of this paper, they also share one key difference: while Egypt is a land-scarce
country, where the poor lack access to productive land and are thus "pushed" to work in
the nonfarm sector, Jordan represents a different type of land-scarce country, in which the
irrigated land mass is so small that the rural rich are "pulled" (by more attractive rates of
return) into the nonfarm sector.
The paper seeks to make three contributions. First, it uses standard
decomposition techniques based on the Gini coefficient to pinpoint the contribution of
different sources of rural income - including nonfarm income - to rural inequality in
Egypt and Jordan. This analysis finds that nonfarm income has very different impacts on
inequality in the two study countries: in Egypt nonfarm income improves inequality,
while in Jordan nonfarm income has a negative impact on inequality. Second, in an
effort to understand the reasons for this difference, the study then decomposes the sources
of nonfarm income inequality in order to understand how the various types of nonfarm4
income contribute to income inequality. This analysis finds that income from
government employment represents  the largest share of nonfarm income in both
countries. Third, the study applies a new income decomposition procedure based on
regression analysis to the data from rural Egypt. This procedure, which cannot be applied
to Jordan because of the lack of data on landowning,  provides a flexible and efficient way
for quantifying the role of various household-level  variables in "determining" the level of
income inequality. This analysis finds that landownership,  which is distributed very
unevenly in rural Egypt, is negatively and significantly  related to the determination of
nonfarm income.
The study proceeds in six further sections. Section I presents the standard
decomposition  of the Gini coefficient. Section II discusses the household data sets from
Egypt and Jordan. Section III uses the Gini decomposition to analyze the contribution  of
the different sources of income - including nonfarm income - to overall rural inequality.
Section IV presents the new decomposition  procedure based on regression analysis, and
Section V uses this new procedure to pinpoint the contribution of landownership to
nonfarm and agricultural income inequality in rural Egypt.  Section VI concludes.
I.  Decomposition of Income Inequality  Based on Gini Coefficient
According to the literature, any decomposable  inequality measure should have
five basic properties. They are: (1) Pigou-Dalton  transfer sensitivity; (2) symmetry; (3)
mean independence; (4) population homogeneity;  and (5) decomposability.5
Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity holds if the measure of inequality increases
whenever  income is transferred from one person to someone richer.  Symmetry holds if
the measure of inequality remains unchanged when individuals switch places in the
income order. Mean independence holds if a proportionate change in all incomes leaves
the measure of inequality unchanged. Population homogeneity holds if increasing (or
decreasing) the population size across all income levels has no effect on the measured
level of inequality.
The property of decomposability  allows inequality to be partitioned either over
sub-populations  or sources. It is the latter type of decomposition that is the subject of this
analysis. Ideally, an inequality measure can be regarded as source decomposable  if total
inequality  can be broken down into a weighted sum of inequality by various income
sources (for example, nonfarm and agricultural income).
One of the measures of inequality which meets the five preceding properties is the
Gini coefficient. The source decomposition of the Gini coefficient can be developed
following  the notation of Stark et al: 8
K
G = XRkGkSk  (1)
k=1
where:
Skis the share of source k of income in total group income (i.e. Sk  =  k
Gk is the Gini coefficient measuring the inequality in the distribution of income
component k within the group, and
R k is the Gini correlation of income from source k  with total income, 9 defined
as:6
cov[Yk,  F(Y)]
Rk  cov[Yk,  F(Yk  )]  (2)
Equation (2) shows that the effect of source k income on overall income
inequality can be broken down into three components:
(a) the share of income component k in total income (captured by the term Sk);
(b) the inequality within the sample of income from source k (as measured by Gk);
(c)  the correlation between source k income and total income (as measured by
Rk).
Using this decomposition,  it is possible to identify how much of overall income
inequality is due to a particular income source. Assuming that additional increments of
an income source are distributed in the same manner as the original units, it is also
possible to use this decomposition  to ask whether an income source is inequality-
increasing or inequality-decreasing  on the basis of whether or not an enlarged share of
that income source leads to an increase or decrease in overall income inequality. On the
basis of equation (2):
gk  kRK  GK  (3)
G
where gk is the relative concentration coefficient of income source k  in overall
inequality.
From equation (3) it follows that income source k is inequality-increasing or
inequality-decreasing according to whether gk  is greater than or less than unity.' 0
II a. Data Sets for Egypt and Jordan7
Egypt data come from a single-round,  nationally-representative household budget
survey that was conducted in 1997  on 2,500 households in 20 different urban and rural
governorates in Egypt.  This survey - the Egypt Integrated Household Survey - was
quite broad, collecting data on such diverse topics as:  income, expenditures, education,
employment, food consumption, health and nutrition, landownings, migration and rural
credit."  The sample frame used for selecting  households in the survey was supplied by
the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).' 2
The rural portion of this Egypt Integrated Household survey included 1,327 rural
households drawn from 17 rural governorates. Of this total, 26 households were
excluded because of missing or incomplete data. The analysis is therefore based on data
from 1,301 rural households.
Jordan data come from a four-round, nationally-representative  household budget
survey that was conducted in 1997  on 5,970 households in urban and rural Jordan. This
survey -- the Household Income and Expenditure  Survey (HIES)  --  was done by the
Jordan Department of Statistics, and was not nearly as broad as the Egypt survey. For
example, the Jordan HIES focused on income and expenditure data, and did not collect
any data on health and nutrition, migration and (most importantly for this study)
landholding. Two of the rounds -- rounds 2 and 4 -- gathered data on income.
The rural portion of the Jordan HIES included 1,451 households, and the analysis
is based on all of these households.
II b.  Sources of Income
The concept of income used in this study is as comprehensive as possible, subject
to the limitations of the data collected in each survey.8
In Egypt the definition of income is more complete, including income received in
kind as well as in cash.  In Egypt a money value was imputed to receipts in kind,
household consumption of crops and crop by-products, and home-consumed livestock.
Because of uncertainty about how to deduct imputed land rent from agricultural income,
no values for imputed land rent were calculated. Similarly, because of the thin rental
market for housing in rural Egypt,' 3 no values were imputed for the rent of owner-
occupied housing. Finally, because of uncertainty about how to accurately calculate
wage rates for family members, no values were imputed for family labor involved in crop
and livestock production.
In Jordan the definition of income in the survey is more limited. Because the
agricultural sector is much smaller in Jordan,' 4 the Jordan HIES did not collect data on
either income earned from livestock or crop production. This is an important lacuna,
which complicates efforts to compare the results of the Egypt and Jordan surveys. Given
this omission, this study did not impute any values for the household consumption of
crops, crop by-products or home-consumed  livestock. While the Jordan HIES did collect
data on income earned from land and house rent, to be consistent with the Egypt survey,
no values were calculated for either imputed land rent or the rent of owner-occupied
housing. Like Egypt, because of uncertainty about how to accurately calculate family
wage rates for family members, no values were imputed for family labor involved in crop
and livestock production in Jordan.
The study divided total income for each rural household into five sources (for
Egypt) and four sources (for Jordan)' 59
(1) Nonfarm - For both countries, includes wage earnings from nonagricultural
labor, government and private sector employment plus net revenues from non-farm
enterprises;
(2) Agricultural  - For Egypt, includes net income from all crop production
including imputed values from home production and crop byproducts plus wages
received from agricultural labor; for Jordan, includes gross income from private work
agriculture,  sales of agricultural goods and services, wages received from agricultural
labor and income from land sales.
(3) Livestock - For Egypt, includes net returns from traded livestock (cows,
bullocks, buffalo, goats, sheep) and small animals (chickens, pigeons, rabbits, duck), plus
imputed values of home-consumed livestock (meat) and animal products (milk, cheese)
plus plowing services;
(4) Transfer - For both countries, includes net public and private transfers plus net
remittances (in cash and in kind) plus pensions plus interest and dividends received from
pensions, securities and savings.
(5) Rental - For Egypt, includes rents (in cash and in kind) received from
ownership of such assets as land, machinery and housing; for Jordan, includes only cash
rents received from land and housing.
Although the reasons for dividing income into these sources of income should be
apparent, in Egypt the rationale for distinguishing between agricultural and livestock
income may need clarification. On the one hand, some observers may claim that within a
rural economy it is artificial (and empirically difficult)  to distinguish between agricultural
and livestock income, since outputs from one - such as straw and crop residuals from
agriculture, and draft power and manure from livestock - are used as inputs in the other.10
On the other hand, the goal of this study is to disaggregate  the sources of income
inequality as finely as possible. For this reason, it seems essential to clistinguish  in rural
Egypt between agricultural and livestock income, because these two income sources have
very different effects on inequality. According to the data, the simple correlation
between agricultural income and total income in Egypt is the highest of all five income
sources: 0.844. By contrast, the simple correlation between livestock income and total
income is one of the lowest: 0.232."6  It is unfortunate that data for livestock income in
Jordan are lacking, in order to compare these results with those of Jordan.
Table 1 presents summary data for the various sources of income. The table
shows quite clearly the importance of rural income other than agricultural income. In
both countries, nonfarm income represents the single most important source of income,
accounting for 42.2 and 50.6 percent of total rural household income in Egypt and
Jordan, respectively. Although definitions of nonfarm income vary widely," these
percentage figures for nonfarm income are comparable to those recorded in other studies.
For example, a recent review of rural household budget surveys in 13 African, Asian and
Latin American countries found that nonfarm income accounts for between 13 and 72
percent of total rural household income."
The Gini coefficients of per capita rural income for Egypt and Jordan are 0.532
and 0.408, respectively. On the one hand, it is a bit surprising that the Gini coefficient
for rural Egypt is much higher than that for rural Jordan. This large difference may
reflect the absence of data on crop income in Jordan. In many countries crop income --
since it is dependent on land access -- is unequally distributed, and so the inclusion of this
source of income would probably increase the Gini coefficient for rural Jordan.' 9
However, it should be noted that the Gini coefficients for Egypt and Jordan are well11
within the range of income Ginis recorded for other developing countries. For instance,
the income Ginis recorded in the most recent edition of World Development Indicators
suggest that Gini coefficients of per capita household income range from a low of 0.420
(Bolivia) to a high of 0.601 (Brazil). 20
In Table 2 the sources of rural income for Egypt and Jordan are presented by
income quintile group. The results suggest that nonfarm income plays a radically
different role for the poor in the two countries. While in Egypt the poor -- that is, those
in the lowest quintile group - receive almost 60 percent of their total per capita income
from nonfarm income, in Jordan the poor receive less than 20 percent of their total per
capita income from this source. Furthermore,  while in Egypt the share of nonfarm
income in total income generally falls as income rises, in Jordan the share of nonfarm
income in total income typically increases.
The reasons for this dramatic difference have to do with land. In Egypt the
cultivated land base is 100 percent irrigated and highly productive with yields for the
main field crops (wheat and rice) among the highest in the world. The large number of
people living in rural Egypt therefore all seek access to agricultural land. However, in
fact, the very real land constraints in rural Egypt -- 75.7 percent of the households in this
sample own no land 2' - force most people (and especially the poor) to earn their
livelihood from outside agriculture. In Jordan the situation is quite different. Only 30
percent of the cultivated land base is irrigated, and the main field crops (wheat and
barley) are generally grown under rainfed conditions and so yields are low. 22 People in
rural Jordan thus do not press for land access, since the really attractive economic rates of
return are to be found not in agriculture,  but rather in the nonfarm sector. In clear
contrast to Egypt, the rich in rural Jordan thus earn less than 10 percent of their total per12
capita income from agriculture and over 55 percent of their total incorne from nonfarm
sources.
Im a.  Rural Income Inequality in Egypt and Jordan, 1997
Decomposing the Gini coefficient provides two ways of measuring the
contribution  of any income source to overall income inequality. First, it is possible to
identify how much of overall income inequality is due to any particular source of income.
Second, it can be asked whether inequality in an income source serves to increase or
decrease overall income inequality. 23
Table 3 reports the results of the Gini decomposition. The results show that while
nonfarm  income has the largest share (Sk)  in total rural income in both countries, its
contribution to rural income inequality is quite different. In absolute terms (SkGkRk)
nonfarm income accounts for 0.158 and 0.218 of rural income inequality in Egypt and
Jordan, respectively. However, in percentage terms, while nonfarm income contributes
only 29.7 percent to rural income inequality in Egypt, it accounts for over 53 percent of
such inequality in Jordan. In Jordan, nonfarm income makes the single largest
contribution  to rural income inequality.
There are at least two reasons for the differing effects of nonfarm income on rural
inequality in Egypt and Jordan. The first reason relates to the role of agricultural income.
In Egypt agricultural income accounts for the second largest share (Sk = 24.6 percent) of
rural income and it is very unequally distributed (Gk  = 1.155). As a result, agricultural
income makes the largest percentage contribution  (40.2 percent) to income inequality in
Egypt. By contrast, in Jordan agricultural income -- perhaps because of measurement
problems (e.g. not including crop income) and perhaps because of the low returns13
involved in rainfed agriculture -- accounts for the lowest share (Sk = 8.5 percent) of total
rural income. With a tiny share of income, and a low correlation with total income
rankings (Rk  = 0.439), agricultural income makes the smallest contribution to rural
income inequality in Jordan.
The second reason relates to the correlation of nonfarm income with total income
rankings. In Egypt nonfarm income and total income are not highly correlated (Rk  =
0.590), but in Jordan the two are highly correlated (Rk  = 0.760). This suggests that in
Jordan nonfarm income is -- to a large extent  -- closely synonymous  with total rural
income. In Jordan nonfarm income is not only the single, most important source of
income, but it is also very similar to nonfarm income as a whole.
The decomposition  results in Table 3 can also be used to distinguish between
inequality-increasing  and inequality-decreasing  sources of income.  According to the
relative concentration coefficients (g), in Egypt two sources of income - agricultural and
rental - represent inequality-increasing  sources of income. This means that, ceteris
paribus, additional increments of agricultural and rental income will increase rural
income inequality. By contrast, in Jordan only one source of income - nonfarm -
represents an inequality-increasing  source of income.14
III b. Nonfarm Income Inequality in Egypt and Jordan
For the purposes of policy analysis, it is useful to decompose the sources of
nonfarm income in order to answer the question: What is the impact on inequality of
different kinds of nonfarm income?
In this study nonfarm income can be divided into five sources (for Egypt) and four
sources (for Jordan):
(1) Government employment - For both countries, includes wages from all
government and public sector service;
(2) Private sector - For both countries, includes wages from private sector
companies;
(3) Unskilled labor - For both countries, includes wages from any unskilled
nonfarm activity, such as construction, brick-making and ditch digging;
(4) Self-employment - For Egypt, includes profits and earnings from shopkeeping
and artisan activities, such as tailoring and shoe repair.
(5) Other -For Jordan, includes revenues from building sales.
Table 4 presents the sources of nonfarm income disaggregated by income quintile
group. In both countries the poor are heavily dependent on one particular source of
nonfarm income: government employment. In Egypt, the poor -- those in the lowest
quintile group -- receive 43 percent of their nonfarm income from government wages,
while in Jordan the poor receive 60 percent of their nonfarm income from this source.
There is, however, one key difference. While in Egypt the proportion of nonfarm income
from government employment does not vary much by income group, in Jordan the
proportion is positively related to income. In rural Jordan those in the top quintile group15
receive over 68 percent of their nonfarm income from government employment, which is
a much higher share than the poor.
Why is government employment  so important to the poor (and nonpoor) in Egypt
and Jordan? The best answer to this question comes from Bent Hansen, who observed 15
years ago that in Egypt:
...  the government sector predominates everywhere (in urban and rural areas). The
government is a realistic employment  alternative in all walks of life,
including unskilled, illiterate rural workers. 35 percent of government workers (in
Egypt)... .have no education whatsoever. 2'
Hansen's observations about the incredible ability of the government
sector to absorb all types of workers seems as true today as it was 15 years ago. In
Egypt, of the 464 rural males over age 15 who work for the government, 16 percent have
no education and 39 percent have an elementary school degree or less; in Jordan, of the
923 rural males over 15 who work for the government, 5 percent have no education and
30 percent have an elementary degree or less.'
Table 5 reports the results of the Gini decomposition for nonfarm income. The
findings are rather paradoxical. On the one hand, government employment makes the
largest percentage contribution to nonfarm inequality: 41.6 percent in Egypt and 69.7
percent in Jordan. In both countries government  employment makes the largest
contribution to nonfarm inequality primarily because of its large income share (Sk).
However, on the other hand, the relative concentration coefficients (g) show that
government employment is actually an inequality-decreasing source of nonfarm income.
In both Egypt and Jordan g is less than unity because the percentage contribution of
government employment to nonfarm inequality is less than its share of nonfarm income.
This means that, holding other variables constant, additional increments of income from
government employment will actually reduce nonfarm inequality.16
Two policy conclusions follow from these results. First, despite the previously
cited literature on the growth linkages effects of agricultural growth, it is difficult to see
how agricultural growth in either Egypt or Jordan has led to an expansion of the most
important inequality-decreasing  component of nonfarm income: government
employment. It would seem more reasonable to argue that in both countries the
government has consciously decided to expand its work rolls to absorb as many workers
- literate and non-literate, skilled and non-skilled -- as possible.  According to a recent
World Bank report, "Traditionally, Egypt's primary social safety net (to help the poor)
has been (government) employment. (This) has provided significant benefits to the poor
and lower middle class .... ."  The second policy conclusion follows immediately from
the first.  Since the work rolls of Egyptian and Jordanian government employment are
already quite over-extended, with far more government workers employed than there are
actual jobs to keep them occupied, it would be foolhardy from a policy standpoint to
advocate increased government employment as a means of reducing rural income
inequality in either country. If the concern is with equity, then perhaps it would be more
productive to urge a renewed focus on a second component of nonfarm income:
unskilled labor. Table 5 shows that in Egypt unskilled income -- from construction work,
brick-making  and ditch-digging -- represents the second largest share (23.5 percent) of
nonfarm income and it also is an inequality-decreasing  source of overall income (g =
0.777). In rural Jordan unskilled income represents an inequality-decreasing source of
income (g = 0.804).  More attention to the needs of unskilled nonfarm workers -- such as
construction workers, brick-makers and ditch-diggers -- would help improve the
distribution of income in both Egypt and Jordan.17
IV. A New Decomposition Approach Based on Regression Analysis
The Gini decomposition of income inequality addresses the key questions of which
sources of income - such as nonfarm or agricultural income - contribute to overall
income inequality, and which income sources help to raise or lower total inequality.
However, this approach to income decomnposition  is of more limited use in identifying
the causes of inequality. In other words, the Gini decomposition cannot describe how
household-level  variables such as land, education and age "cause" or "determine" income
inequality.
It is therefore instructive to supplement the standard Gini decomposition with a
new approach to inequality decomposition which is based on regression analysis. This
new approach provides a flexible and efficient way of quantifying the roles of different
determinants of income - such as landownership  and other variables - on the level of
income inequality.  In other words, the new approach answers the question of  how much
a given determinant of income contributes to income inequality, given a certain level of
inequality.
Following Morduch and Sicular, 27 the new decomposition approach can be defined
by reference to the income equation:
Y = X,8+e,  (4)
where X is an n x M matrix of independent  variables with the first column given
by the n-vector e = (1, 1, ..., 1), /8 is an M-vector of regression coefficients, and E is an
n-vector of residuals.18
The M coefficients can be estimated using appropriate econometric techniques
with specification corrections as required. Predictions of per capita income from each
source of income Yk  = X,J can be formed using information from the entire data set. 28
The econometric results yield estimates of the income flows attributed to various
household variables. This allows allow us to decompose inequality by factor income -
that is, to apportion inequality to the various components of income, where the sum of
these components equals total source income, Yik = SkI  Here the analogues are the
y  = X,/',  the income contributed  by land, education, age etc., as given by the
regression results. By construction, total source income is the sum of these flows (plus
the regression residual):
M +l
Yik =  iY,k  for all i,  (5)
m=l
where Y1;  =  /mX:km  form =1,...,M
Y,k  Eik  form  = M+ 1.
These income flows can then be used directly to calculate decomposition
components for all regression variables. The shares take the form:
(L a'  (Y)X
s(Xm,Y)=  ,6m  I(r  )  for m  =  ,  ,M.  (6)19
V. Using Regression Analysis to Identify the Determinants of Income Inequalitv in
EgYpt
The preceding approach can be implemented by using regression analysis to
estimate the determinants of the various sources of income in this study. Since the goal
here is to quantify the contribution  of land to the determination of different kinds of
income, this analysis cannot be applied to Jordan because the 1997 HIES Survey did not
collect any data on landownership. The remainder of this section therefore focuses on the
1997 data from rural Egypt.
Two hypotheses are to be tested in this section. First, since land is distributed so
unevenly in rural Egypt, 29 and land is such a vital component of agricultural production, it
can be hypothesized that the close relationship  between land and agriculture "causes"
agricultural income to go mainly to the rich. Second, it is possible that nonfarm income
is an inequality-decreasing source of income in rural Egypt precisely because nonfarm
income has no relationship with size of land owned.
The challenge in using regression analysis to test these hypotheses in rural Egypt
is twofold: first, to identify those exogenous household-level factors (including
landownership)  which somehow "cause" income to be produced; and second, to pinpoint
the relative importance of each of those factors in producing different types of income
(such as agricultural and nonfarm income).
In the strictest sense, most of the relevant income-producing variables that can be
identified in rural Egypt reflect a series of endogenous rather than exogenous choices
made by the household. However, the management and taste factors that affect such
choices should be fixed, and, therefore should not seriously bias the regression estimates.20
Following the standard household model, it can be assumed that a rural household
maximizes utility by allocating the land, labor and capital of its family members to
various agricultural and non-agricultural tasks. From the first-order optimum conditions,
land, labor time and capital service allocation functions can be derived to various
household tasks that commonly depend on a set of factor prices, technology, personal
characteristics  of household members, and ownership of land and nonland resources.
Factor prices (including land rent and residual return to land) depend on technology and
personal household characteristics (such as management ability) that cannot be assumed
to be exogenous. For this reason, it is desirable to estimate the factor price and factor
allocation functions simultaneously. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be used here
because the quantities and prices of household-supplied  factors for most household
activities cannot be accurately estimated, either in this or most other household-level
surveys. Therefore, in this section the reduced form income determination functions are
estimated without distinguishing factor prices and quantities, which depend on
technology, ownership of resources, and other household characteristics.
Specifically, in order to identify the determinants of income, each of the five
sources of income in rural Egypt - nonfarm, agricultural, transfer, livestock and rental -
are regressed on three types of household-level  inputs which are thought to cause income:
land (i.e. size of landowned, size of land rented in); labor (i.e. household size, mean age
of all household members, number of males over age 15); and capital (i.e. mean
education of males over age 15, value of farm equipment owned, value of enterprises
owned). In addition, since the Egyptian data come from widely scattered rural areas,
differences in land, water and other inputs may affect the determination of income. For21
this reason, 16 govemorate-level dummy variables are included in the model. Table 6
reports means and standard deviations for the model.
While the model was estimated on all households in the rural Egypt sample, it
should be noted that many survey households do not receive a particular source of
income. For instance, Table 3 shows that only 60 percent of households receive nonfarm
income. With so many zero values for the dependent variable, using ordinary least
squares (OLS) to estimate the model would lead to biased and inconsistent results.
Proper estimation of the model requires use of either a self-selection procedure or a
censored regression. However, estimating the model using the two-stage selection
procedure proposed by Heckman produced poor results. 30 For this reason, tobit was
chosen as the estimator. The tobit method assumes that the two stages of the decision-
making process (for example, the decision to work in nonfarm and the decision to receive
nonfarm income) occur simultaneously. In the estimations, a separate tobit equation was
estimated for each of the five sources of income in rural Egypt.
The results of the tobit estimation are shown in Table 7.  In rural Egypt land
owned is positively and statistically  related to the receipt of three types of income:
agricultural, livestock and rental. However, calculating the marginal effects from the
tobit regression suggest that an increase in the amount of land owned by the household
will have the largest positive effect on agricultural income. According to Table 8, a one
feddan increase in land owned in Egypt will lead to a  68.3 LE increase in per capita
household income from agriculture as opposed to only a 7.9 LE increase in household
income from livestock income and a 20.7 LE increase in household income from rental
income.22
By comparison, Table 8 reveals that an increase in land owned in Egypt has a
negative effect on the receipt of nonfarm income. For nonfarm income, a one feddan
increase in the amount of land owned actually leads to a statistically significant reduction
of 26.1 LE in per capita household income from nonfarm (Table 8).  These results
suggest that while agricultural income is positively associated with landownership in
Egypt, which is unevenly distributed in favor of the rich, nonfarm income is not linked
with land ownership and thus is more important to the poor.
VI. Results of New Decomposition Approach: Land and Income Inequality in Egypt
The results of the tobit regression can be used in the new decomposition approach
to assess the relative magnitudes and distributions of different variables for two types of
income in rural Egypt:  nonfarm and agricultural income. These two types of income are
chosen to highlight the different contributions that one specific variable - landownership
- makes to income inequality.
Table 9 represents the bridge between the tobit regression results in Table 7 and the
decompositions that follow in Table 10. The first column of Table 9 gives average
income shares, which is the faction of the mean of per capita income that is given by the
mean value of each variable multiplied by its coefficient from either the nonfarm or the
agricultural income equation in Table 7. The results show that the land owned variable
generates a large, positive share (30.5 percent) of average income for agricultural income
in Egypt. In fact, among statistically significant variables, land owned generates the
largest positive share of agricultural income. 3'  By comparison, land owned generates a
negative and statistically significant share (-4.7 percent) of average income for nonfarm23
income. Among the significant variables, the net sum of the age and age squared
variables generate the largest positive share of nonfarm income in Egypt.
Table 9 also shows the distribution of the income shares of the explanatory
variables across quintile groups in Egypt. The income flows from the household size, age
and education variables are distributed relatively equitably, with similar shares going to
the top and bottom quintiles of the income distribution. However, as might be expected,
the variables relating to asset ownership - land owned, farm equipment and enterprises --
are distributed very unequally, with the top quintile receiving more than 4 times the
income share of the bottom quintile. Yet, of these three asset ownership variables, only
one - land owned - generates a very large share of income in rural Egypt. Land owned
generates both a large proportion (30 percent) of agricultural income and it is also
distributed quite unevenly.
Table 10 gives the results from the inequality decompositions for nonfarm and
agricultural income in rural Egypt. In the decompositions, when income from a factor is
distributed uniformly among households, its proportional contribution to inequality is
zero. For this reason, the constant term contributes zero to inequality for both sources of
income. Also, since a factor's contribution depends only on the variation of that factor's
income around the mean, and not on the mean itself, those factors which are distributed
fairly equally among households will not make much of a contribution to inequality.
This explains the relatively small contributions to inequality of such variables as
household size, mean age, and number of household males over 15 years.
With respect to the land variable, the results in Table 10 suggest very different
outcomes. In Egypt the land owned variable reduces nonfarm income inequality, and this
relationship is statistically significant. For agricultural income, however, the land owned24
variable  increases income inequality. In fact, for agricultural income, land owned
accounts for the single largest share (38 percent) of agricultural income inequality in
Egypt.
Table 10 suggests that it is the close relationship between land owned - which is
distributed very unevenly - and agricultural income which skews the distribution of
agricultural income in favor of the rich. Unfortunately, however, the findings in Table 10
do not address the key question of causality. In other words, is it inequality in
landownership  which leads to unequal agricultural income distribution or is it uneven
agricultural income distribution which causes the high concentration of land ownership?
To adequately answer this question for rural Egypt would require more data, specifically,
panel data on how changes in the distribution of agricultural - and other sources of -
income are related to changes in the ownership of land. 32
VI. Conclusion
This study has used decomposition analysis on two new, nationally-representative
household data sets from Egypt and Jordan to examine the impact of different sources of
income - including  nonfarm  income -- on rural income inequality.  Four  key conclusions
emerge.
First, the study shows that nonfarm income has very different impacts on poverty
and inequality in the two study countries. While in Egypt the poor -- that is, those in the
lowest quintile group -- receive almost 60 percent of their total per capita income from
nonfarm income, in Jordan the poor receive less than 20 percent of their income from this
source. With respect to inequality, nonfarm income represents an inequality-decreasing25
source of income in rural Egypt, while in Jordan it represents an inequality-increasing
source of income.
Second, the reasons for the differing effects of  nonfarm income have to
do with land. In Egypt the cultivated land base is 100 percent irrigated and very highly
productive. The large number of people living in rural Egypt therefore all seek land
access, but given the very unfavorable land-to-people  ratio, only a minority of rural
inhabitants actually own land. The rest (and especially the poor) are all forced to seek
work in the nonfarm sector. By contrast, in Jordan only 30 percent of the cultivated land
base is irrigated and crop yields are low. People in rural Jordan thus do not press for land
access, since the really attractive economic rates of return are found -- not in agriculture -
-but in the nonfarm sector. In clear contrast to Egypt, the rich in rural Jordan earn less
than 10 percent of their total per capita income from agriculture and over 55 percent of
such income from nonfarm sources.
T hird, the analysis shows that the poor in both countries are dependent on one
particular source of nonfarm income: government employment. In Egypt the poor
receive 43 percent of their nonfarm income from government wages, while in Jordan the
poor receive 60 percent of their nonfarm income from this source. As a result,
government employment represents an inequality-decreasing  source of income in both
countries. However, since both governments already employ far more workers than they
can possibly use, from a policy standpoint it would not be desirable to advocate increased
government employment as a means of reducing income inequality in either Egypt or
Jordan.  Rather, it would be more productive for policymakers to focus on a second
component of nonfarm income: unskilled labor. In both Egypt and Jordan unskilled26
labor - in such fields as construction, brick-making and ditch-digging - represents an
important inequality-decreasing source of income. 33
Finally, this study affirms the close tie between land, nonfarm income and the
poor. While landowning data are lacking for Jordan, in Egypt it seems that nonfarm
income is an inequality-decreasing source of income because inadequate land access in
that country "pushes" poorer households out of agriculture and into the nonfarm sector.
In this study 75.7 percent of rural Egyptian households own no land and the Gini
coefficient of landownership  (0.899) is much higher than the Gini coefficient of income
(0.532). For this reason, the new income decomposition analysis presented in this study
shows that while the variable land owned accounts for the single largest share (38
percent) of agricultural income inequality in Egypt, this variable actually accounts for a
negative share (-12 percent) of nonfarm  income inequality. In other words, while
agricultural income is positively associated with landownership in rural Egypt, which is
unevenly distributed in favor of the rich, nonfarm income is not linked with
landownership and thus is more important to the poor.27
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Table 1. Summary of Rural Income Data From Egypt and Jordan, 1997
Rural Egypt  Rural Jordan
Source of  Percent of total  Percent of
income  Mean annual  per capita  Mean annual  total per
per capita  household  per capita  capita
household  income from  household  household
income (LE)(')  source  income (JD)(b)  income from
source
Nonfarm  414.1  42.2  323.4  50.6
(626.1)  (3,702.6)
Agricultural  241.3  24.7  54.5  8.5
(1,161.3)  (1,799.5)
Transfer  150.9  15.4  174.3  27.3
(360.8)  (3,510.8)
Livestock  92.6  9.4  - -
(268.7)
Rental  81.3  8.3  87.2  13.6
(311.6)  (1,926.1)
Total  980.2  100.0  639.5  100.0
(1,480.7)  (5,988.6)
Sources: Egypt: Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Jordan:  Jordan Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1997.
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are standard  deviations. Mean income figures include
negative source incomes recorded for some households. N = 1,301 households
(Egypt) and 1,451 households (Jordan).
(a) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$ 0.295.
(b) In 1997, 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = US$ 1.410.32
Table 2. Sources of Rural Income in Egypt and Jordan Ranked by Quintile
on the Basis of Total Per Capita Household Income
(a) Rural Egypt
Percent of total per capita income from
Total per  Average




Lowest  4.38  59.0  35.8  2.6  5.4  (-2.8)
Second  402.35  52.1  18.7  19.5  8.3  1.4
Third  615.52  51.3  19.4  16.1  10.6  2.6
Fourth  955.25  52.5  20.4  15.1  8.2  3.9
Highest  2,455.28  38.4  26.0  16.6  8.6  10.4
Total  980.83  42.2  24.7  15.4  9.4  8.3
(b) Rural Jordan
Percent of total per capita income from
Total per  Average




Lowest  111.6  18.9  18.9  38.3  - 23.9
Second  340.8  41.1  7.4  34.7  - 16.8
Third  478.8  53.9  5.6  25.7  - 14.8
Fourth  661.0  53.2  9.5  23.9  - 13.5
Highest  1,311.7  55.6  8.6  23.9  - 11.9
Total  639.5  50.6  8.5  27.3  - 13.6
Notes:
(a) Quintile groups based on population (not households) because poorer households
tend to be larger.
(b) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$ 0.295.
(c) In 1997, 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = US$ 1.410.33
Table 3.  Decomposition of Overall Rural Income Inequality in Egypt and Jordan
Contribution of  Percentage
Proportion of  Gini  income source  Relative  contribution
households  Gini  correlation with  to overall  concentration  to overall
receiving  Share in total  coefficient for  total income  income  coefficient of  income
Income source  income source  income  income source(a)  rankings  inequality  income source  inequality
(PK)  (SK)  (GK)  (RK)  (SKGKRK)  (  R. G,
(a) Rural Egypt
Nonfarm  0.607  0.422  0.634  0.590  0.158  0.703  29.7
Agricultural  0.669  0.246  1.155  0.750  0.214  1.628  40.2
Transfer  0.509  0.154  0.848  0.488  0.064  0.778  12.0
Livestock  0.695  0.094  0.935  0.376  0.034  0.661  6.4
Rental  0.317  0.083  0.924  0.805  0.062  1.398  11.7
Total  - 1.000  - - 0.532  - 100.0
(b) Rural Jordan
Nonfarm  0.685  0.506  0.567  0.760  0.218  1.046  53.5
Agricultural  0.176  0.085  0.919  0.439  0.034  0.979  8.3
Transfer  0.913  0.273  0.726  0.560  0.111  0.987  27.2
Livestock  - - - - - - -
Rental  0.848  0.136  0.535  0.625  0.045  0.812  11.0
Total  - 1.000  - - 0.408  - 100.0
Notes:  All estimates are based on annual per capita household income.
(a) Source ginis (GK)  are high because they include households with zero and negative incomes from different income sources.  Source ginis
can exceed unity if many of y, are negative.34
Table 4. Sources of Nonfarm Income in Egypt and Jordan Ranked by Quintile
on the Basis of Total Per Capita Household Income
(a) Rural Egypt
Total  Average  Percent of per capita nonfarm income from:
per capita  per capita  Govemment  Private  Unskilled  Self-employment  Other
income quintile(a)  nonfarm income  employment  sector  labor
(L)(b) (LE)°
Lowest  95.64  43.0  17.1  23.6  16.2  -
Second  211.34  38.9  14.7  36.5  9.9  -
Third  313.86  53.7  14.7  19.1  12.4  -
Fourth  500.20  51.3  12.4  20.3  16.0  -
Highest  808.56  42.2  12.5  20.0  25.3  -
Total  414.09  45.9  13.2  21.7  19.3  -
(b) Rural Jordan
Total  Average  Percent of per capita nonfarm income from:
per capita  per capita  Government  Private  Unskilled  Self-employment  Other
income guintile(a)  nonfarm income  employment  sector  labor
(JD)(C)
Lowest  26.42  60.1  26.8  13.1  - 0.0
Second  141.64  72.9  18.3  8.8  - 0.0
Third  257.73  81.8  11.7  6.4  - 0.0
Fourth  349.51  80.7  14.7  4.4  - 0.3
Highest  682.03  68.8  21.3  8.3  - 1.6
Total  323.42  73.5  18.3  7.3  - 0.9
Notes:
(a) Quintile groups based on population (not households) because poorer households tend to be larger.
(b) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) - US$ 0.295.
(c)  In 1997, 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = US$ 1.410.35
Table 5. Decomposition  of Nonfarm Income Inequality in Egypt and Jordan
Contribution of  Percentage
Proportion of  Gini  income source  Relative  contribution
households  Share in  Gini  correlation with  to overall  concentration  to nonfarm
receiving  nonfarm  coefficient for  total income  income  coefficient of  income
Income source  income source  income  income source(3)  rankings  inequality  income source  inequality
(PK)  (SK)  (GK)  (RK)  (SKGKRK)  (g= R9,
(a) Rural Egypt
Government  0.550  0.488  0.641  0.435  0.136  0.704  41.6
employment
Private sector  0.147  0.123  0.908  0.369  0.041  0.846  12.6
Unskilled  labor  0.324  0.235  0.839  0.367  0.072  0.777  22.0
Self-employment  0.209  0.155  0.897  0.562  0.078  1.273  23.8
Other  _  _  _
Total  - 1.000  - - - 100.0
(b) Rural Jordan
Government  0.526  0.735  0.658  0.625  0.302  0.718  69.7
employment
Private sector  0.145  0.183  0.919  0.528  0.089  0.848  20.6
Unskilled labor  0.079  0.073  0.965  0.477  0.034  0.804  7.8
Self-employment  - - _  _  - _  _
Other  0.006  0.009  0.999  0.898  0.008  1.568  1.9
Total  - 1.000  - - - 100.0
Notes:  All estimates are based on annual per capita household income.
(a)  Source  ginis (GK)  are high because they include households with zero and negative incomes from different income sources. Source ginis
can exceed  unity if many of y1are negative.36
Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations for Determinants  of Rural Income Regression in Egypt
Variable
Amount of land owned by household  0.43
(feddans)(a)  (1.68)
Amount of land rented in by household  0.19
(feddans)(a)  (0.71)
Household size  6.70
(3.54)
Mean age of all household members  26.39
(11.74)
Mean age of all members squared  842.56
(928.38)
Number of household males over 15 years  1.87
(1.32)
Mean education of household males over  5.56
15 years  (4.72)
Mean education of household males  54.58
squared  (68.17)
Value of farm equipment owned (LE)(b)  527.66
(3738.95)
Value of enterprises(C)  owned (LE)(b)  1058.18
(6624.03)
Notes:  N = 1301 households. Standard deviations in parentheses. Governorate-level dummy variables
are not reported.
(a)  1 feddan = 1.038 acres
(b) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$0.295.
(c) Enterprises include shops, stores, pharmacies and other business activities.37
Table 7.  Tobit Analysis of Determinants of Rural Income in Egypt
Annual Per Capita Household Income From:
Variable  Non-Farm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Land
Amount of land owned  46.104  171.802  3.572  18.021  82.622
by household  (-2.778)**  (5.761)**  (0.323)  (2.644)**  (2.354)**
Amount of land rented  -148.908  -367.564  -62.105  66.099  61.333
in by household  (-3.124)**  (-4.176)**  (-1.934)  (4.328)**  (2.354)*
Labor
Household size  -32.311  24.372  0.698  2.743  16.669
(-2.819)**  (1.078)  (0.079)  (0.519)  (1.730)
Mean age of all household  42.572  -18.454  22.539  0.577  2.584
members  (4.145)**  (-0.980)  (3.400)**  (0.130)  (0.319)
Mean age of all members  -0.691  0.451  -0.083  -0.006  0.144
squared  (-4.968)**  (1.966)*  (-1.042)  (-0.118)  (1.502)
Number of household males  65.319  91.615  -69.169  8.910  13.718
over 15 years  (2.188)*  (1.518)  (-2.933)**  (0.626)  (0.534)
Capital
Mean education of household  21.019  11.225  -28.622  -5.474  -15.169
males over 15 years  (1.237)  (0.322)  (-2.210)*  (-0.670)  (-1.005)
Mean education of household  2.122  -2.850  1.819  0.409  1.165
males squared  (1.894)  (-1.192)  (2.094)*  (0.743)  (1.151)
Value of farm equipment  0.008  -0.003  -0.003  0.008**  0.004
owned  (1.235)  (-0.234)  (-0.548)  (2.768)  (0.881)
Value of enterprises owned  0.020  -0.005  -0.006  0.001  0.004
(5.966)**  (-0.746)  (-1.374)  (0.052)  (1.411)
Sigma  832.5  1615.3  574.9  381.9  610.7
Constant  -276.325  -1093.366  -777.171  -347.700  -1042.868
(-1.314).  (-2.465)*  (-4.580)**  (-3.177)**  (-4.991)*
Log likelihood  -6841.5  -6573.9  4812.7  -5611.1  -3575.3
Notes:  N = 1301 households.
Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics (two-tailed).
Governorate-level  dummy variables are not reported. The dependent variable is annual per capita
household income from the particular income source.
*  Significant at the .05 level.
**  Significant  at the  .01 level.38
Table 8. Marginal Effects of Tobit Regression on Determinants of Rural Income in Egypt
Marginal  Effects  From  Income  Equation  Based  On:
Variable  Non-Farm  Agnicultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Land
Amount  of land  owned  -26.186**  68.388**  1.358  7.913**  20.773**
by household
Amount  of land  rented  -84.577**  -146.313**  -23.624  29.023**  15.421**
in by household
Labor
Household  size  -18.352**  9.702  0.265  1.204  4.191
Mean  age of all household  24.180**  -7.345  8.573**  0.253  0.649
members
Mean  age  of all members  -0.393**  0.179*  -0.031  -0.002  0.036
squared
Number  of household  males  37.100*  36.468  -26.311**  3.912  3.449
over 15 years
Capital
Mean  education  of household  11.939  4.468  -10.887*  -2.403  -3.814
males  over 15  years
Mean  education  of household  1.205  -1.134  0.692*  0.179  0.293
males  squared
Value  of farm  equipment  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  0.003**  0.001
Value  of enterprises  owned  0.011**  -0.002  -0.002  0.001  0.001
Notes:  Marginal  effects  calculated  from  tobit  results  in Table  7; effects  of governorate-level  dummy  variables
are  not reported.
*  Coefficient  in income  equation  significant  at .05 level.
**  Coefficient  in income  equation  significant  at .01 level.39
Table 9. Distribution of Income Flows From Independent Variables in
Non-Farm and Agricultural Income Equations in Egypt
Income Share From:  Income Shares to Quintile Group:  Ratio of
Top
Non-Farm  Agricultural  Quintile to
Income  Income  Bottom
Variable  Equation  Equation  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Quintile
Land
Amount of land  4.7**  30.5**  10.0  10.0  15.0  20.0  45.0  4.5
owned by
household




Household size  -52.3**  67.6  22.3  21.5  20.8  18.8  16.5  0.7
Mean age of all  271.2**  -201.8  18.4  18.5  18.9  20.3  23.8  1.3
household
members
Mean age of all  -140.4**  157.1*  16.4  17.0  17.9  20.1  28.6  1.7
members squared








Mean education  27.9  -64.5  16.4  17.0  17.9  20.1  28.6  1.7
of household
males squared
Value of farm  1.3  -2.1  9.8  20.8  18.4  11.7  39.2  4.0
equipment
Value of  5.1*  -4.4  10.6  7.6  13.5  19.8  48.5  4.6
enterprises
owned
Notes:  Income shares calculated from tobit results in Table 7; income shares of governorate-level  dummy
variables are not reported.
*  Coefficient in income equation significant at .05 level.
**  Coefficient in income equation significant at .01 level.40
Table 10. Decomposition  of Inequality Indices for Non-Farm
and Agricultural Income in Egypt
Vanable  Non-Farm Income  Agricultural Income
Land
Amount of land owned by
household  -12.102**  38.503**
Amount of land rented in by
household  -0.654**  -8.108**
Labor
Household size  -0.694**  3.150
Mean age of all household
members  0.728*  -0.442
Mean age of all members
squared  6.025*  1.462*
Number of household males




15 years  12.110  20.054
Mean education of
household males squared  -6.355  -17.014
Value of farm equipment  10.070  13.100
Value of enterprises owned  8.220*  -12.420
Govemorates  36.901  25.705
Constant  0.000  0.000
Regression Residual  45.701  32.810
Total  100.000  100.000
Notes:
*  Significant at .05 level.
**  Significant  at .01 level.41
Appendix Table 1. Estimation  of Probit Selection Model for Egypt and Jordan
(Males 15 Years and Older)
Private vs. Government Employment (Private Sector = 0,
Government/Public Sector = 1)
Variable  Rural Egypt  Rural Jordan
Personal
Age  0.283  0.071
(10.497)**  (4.648)**
Age squared  -0.304  -0.001
(-9.859)**  (-6.397)**
Head of HH (1 if yes)  -0.153  -0.067
(-1.241)  (-0.540)
Currently married  0.315  0.741




Read, write  0.342  0.186
(2.934)**  (1.470)
Elementary  0.869  0.674
(6.694)**  (5.738)**
Preparatory  1.185  0.708
(6.888)**  (6.340)**
High school (general)  1.347  0.546
(3.419)**  (4.540)**
High school (technical)  1.373  0.575
(11.832)**  (1.361)
Higher institute  2.230  0.756
(9.124)**  (5.187)**
University  1.582  1.271
(9.530)**  (7.848)**
Higher studies  2.050  0.837
(5.276)**  (1.856)
Household
Household size  -0.049  0.001
(-3.658)**  (0.088)
Number of household  0.061  -0.048
males over 15 years  (1.641)  (-1.903)
Constant  -7.166  -2.165
(-13.689)**  (-8.003)**
Log likelihood  -725.2  -1419.9
N  1762  2601
Notes:  Model is estimated on all males 15 years and older. T-ratios are in parentheses.
**  Significant  at the 0.01 level.
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